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Case Comments
Civil Rights: Judicial Interpretation of
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Exception of 1964 Civil Rights Act
Certain female employees brought an action against Col-
gate-Palmolive Company for violations of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. Plaintiffs charged that Colgate intentionally discrimi-
nated against them by using a system of job classification which
denied to females jobs requiring the lifting of over thirty-five
pounds and by using separate male and female seniority lists,
which resulted in layoffs which were discriminatory to females.
The district court held that the separate male and female senior-
ity lists and the layoffs made therefrom did not comply with
the requirements of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
but held that the weight standard came within an exception to
the Act and therefore was valid. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Company, 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
Subsequent to the grant of franchise to women by the
nineteenth amendment, case law and statutes have made signif-
icant strides towards guaranteeing women equal political and
employment rights.1 State laws regulating the conditions of
employment of women or prohibiting their employment altogeth-
er,2 and thereby protecting their health and welfare, have been
upheld consistently under the doctrine that sex furnishes a
reasonable basis for legislative classification. 3 While the laws
1. An equal rights amendment to the Constitution has been pro-
posed every year since 1923. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE STATUS OF
WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 32
(1963) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS].
Recent concern for the legal status of women is evidenced by the
adoption of various measures on the state and federal level. See, e.g.,
Comment, Jane Crow and the Law, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 233
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Jane Crow]; Exec. Order No. 10,980, 3
C.F.R. at 500 (1961); U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMn'N, FEDERAL PERSONN EL
MANUAL ch. 713-6 to 713-8 (1963); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
2. Examples of this type of legislation are minimum wage and
maximum hour laws, and laws which prohibit nightwork in certain occu-
pations or industries or under certain working conditions which are
considered hazardous to health and safety. Some of the prohibited occu-
pations are railroad crossing watchmen, bellhops, electric meter read-
ers, and bartenders. WOMEN's BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1965
HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 226-46 (1965).
3. See REPORT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 34; Jane Crow 236 &
n.30.
The bases for the states' legitimate legislative interest are the
physical, psychological, and social inequalities that exist between the
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upheld under this doctrine were once hailed as great social meas-
ures necessary for the protection of women,4 the purpose and
necessity of legislation which classifies according to sex is being
questioned today.5 Some statutes may still serve to protect
women,6 but others only discriminate against them for undesir-
able reasons.7 Thus, there is an increasing need for re-evaluation
in this area.8
Just prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a
prohibition against sex discrimination was inserted into Title
VII.9 This provision makes it unlawful for an employer to dis-
criminate against individuals on the basis of sex in hiring or
firing and with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment. 10 However, there is an exception
sexes. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 41.2, 421-23 (1908). An attempt
to limit these bases was made in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923), where the Court stated that inequalities other than physical
had almost reached the vanishing point and legislation could no longer
take those inequalities into account. Id. at 552-53. Adkins was over-
ruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and those in-
equalities other than physical were again allowed as bases for separate
treatment of the sexes. Id. at 398. Furthermore, since West Coast
Hotel, interest in the public welfare and morals has also been allowed as
a basis for sex classification. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948); State v. Burke, 79 Idaho 205, 312 P.2d 806 (1957).
4. Anderson, Civil Rights and Fair Employment, 22 Bus. LAW.
513, 522 (1967).
5. PREsnmE's Com'N ON THE STATUS Op WOmE, AMERICAN
WoMNm 7, 44 (1963) [hereinafter cited as AmcrAN WOMEN]. One
writer suggests that the "classification by sex" doctrine should not be
shelved alongside the "separate but equal" doctrine. Jane Crow 240.
Another writer urges that "[m ] any 'sacred cows' should die during the
next few years as the prohibition agaimst sexual discrimination is ap-
plied." Cooksey, The Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity,
7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 417, 429 (1966).
6. See 272 F. Supp. at 364.
7. See id.; A_ FmcAmN WOMEN 36-37; 110 CONG. REc. 2580 (1964)(Rep. Griffiths stated that: "Most of the so-called protective legislation
has really been to protect men's rights in better paying jobs").
8. See AMERicAN WovrN 44-45.
9. In the House, the sex amendment was not considered until the
day before the passage of the Act. Rep. Howard Smith who proposed
the amendment professed to be serious about it, but Rep. Edith Green
believed Rep. Smith only meant to clutter up the bill. The result was
that opponents of the bill were in favor of the amendment, in hopes it
would defeat the bill's passage, while proponents of the bill could only
halfheartedly oppose the amendment because it would appear they
favored discrimination against women which was a politically dangerous
position. Most discussion on the bill was based on emotional reactions
and at times bordered on irrelevancy. 'Miller, Sex Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINx. L. REV. 877, 880-82
(1967).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Similar prohibitions also apply to em-
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to the sex discrimination provision which allows hiring and
employing on the basis of sex where sex is a "bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal oper-
ation of the particular business or enterprise."'11 However,
because of the late addition of the sex discrimination provision,
there exists no useful legislative history to guide the courts in
interpreting the exception,'1 2 although there are other sources
to which the courts can look.13 An excessively broad interpre-
tation of the "bona fide occupational qualification" could subvert
the Act's purpose to provide equal employment opportunity,1 4
while too strict an interpretation would permit sex discrimina-
tion only in extreme cases.' 5
While the Colgate court held without discussion that the
separate male-female seniority lists clearly violated Title VII, it
found, after formulation of a judicial standard to determine
the meaning of the exception, 6 that the weight lifting discrimi-
nation was within the exception and therefore valid. The court
first examined three recently suggested standards 7 for applying
the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception to Title VII's
prohibition against sex discrimination. The "necessity" test,
would allow the employer to discriminate where, in the strictest
sense, only one of the sexes could perform a particular task, such
as working as a fashion model or restroom attendant. The court
ployment agencies, labor organizations, and training programs. 42 U.S.C.§§ 2009e-2(b)-(d).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
12. The amendment was introduced on the last day of House de-
bate. No committee hearings were held and it was adopted under the
"five minute" rule. The House debate covers no more than nine pages
of the Congressional Record. Vaas, Title VII, Legislative History, 7 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 431, 442 (1966). Furthermore, little attention was
given to the amendment in the Senate because the leading proponents of
the Act felt that any discussion would only delay final passage of
the bill. Miller, supra note 9, at 882.
13. The courts will consider state legislation, the guidelines es-
tablished by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other
sources such as the International Labor Organization study, discussed
note 21 infra, as evidenced by the Colgate opinion. See 272 F. Supp. at
354-55. The EEOC guidelines may be found in BNA Daily Labor Re-
port No. 225, Nov. 22, 1965, at E-l; Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage and
Comments, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 459, 469 n.19 (1966).
14. Jane Crow 244.
15. Miller, supra note 9, at 879.
16. Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 260 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.
Tenn. 1966), discussed the exception but it did not attempt to formulate
a standard by which to interpret it.
17. See Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 50 IowA L. REv. 778 (1965).
18. Id. at 794.
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found that this narrow interpretation was inconsistent with the
language of the Act. The "traditional roles" test 9 would
allow an employer to exclude one sex from jobs traditionally
performed by the other. This was rejected by the court as repug-
nant to the purpose of the Act.
The final suggested standard was an "equal protection"
test 20 under which courts would utilize the reasoning of deci-
sions based upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. This standard would permit employers to discrim-
inate, but only where such discrimination is rationally related
to those ends which they have a right to achieve-production,
profit, or business reputation. The court concluded that em-
ployers could profitably use the equal protection reasoning for
guidelines, but proceeded to formulate a standard incorporating
equal protection with other elements.
The court considered the employer's motives in establishing
the weight limitation. It noted that in imposing the discrimina-
tory standards, Colgate had not been guided by evil intent, but
had allegedly wanted to avoid putting women to tests of strength
and endurance that might be harmful to them.21 Although the
weight limitation would increase operational efficiency, this was
not deemed inconsistent with the safety motive. Moreover, the
court found it material that the weight limitation was not
adopted in order to avoid the consequences of the Act. The court
then concluded that classification on the basis of sex would be
permitted on the basis of general, scientifically recognized dif-
ferences in the physical characteristics, abilities, capacities, and
restrictions and limitations of the respective sexes. It cautioned,
however, that classification would not be permitted on the basis
of traditional roles or stereotyped characteristics of taste, talent,
emotions, or tactile ability.
Several difficulties inhere in the court's analysis of the
weight lifting limitation issue. One chief difficulty is its treat-
ment of the employer's motives for establishing a discriminatory
19. Id. at 795-96.
20. Id. at 795.
21. The court and Colgate considered a study held under the aus-
pices of the International Labor Organization. Experts from eleven
countries concluded that the maximum permissible weight to be carried
by women should be fixed at between 33 and 41.1 pounds. The results
were based on psychological, medical, physiological, social, and econom-
ic factors and the avoidance of residual fatigue. Special account was
taken of the unfavorable effects upon the health and progeny of women.
I.L.O. OFciAL BULLETiN No. 3 (1964).
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practice. This consideration appeared to be material to both
elements of the Title VII exception, whether a "bona fide occu-
pational qualification" does exist, and whether it is "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation" of the business.
First, in determining the existence of a "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" the concern for health and safety of female
employees and a desire to maintain the efficient operation of
Colgate's business were seen by the court as acceptable motives
while motivation for financial gain was not considered permis-
sible.22 This acceptance of efficiency and rejection of financial
gain as motives is seemingly contradictory since efficiency may
often lead to higher profits. When higher profits result from a
desire to increase efficiency, such as the exclusion of women
from a particular job which they cannot adequately perform,
such motive of efficiency, even though resulting in financial
gain, should be acceptable. The court implies by its emphasis on
the health and safety of female employees that efficiency alone
is not an acceptable motive. However, the language of the excep-
tion to Title VII seems to make efficiency alone an acceptable
motive for excluding one sex from a particular job because of an
inability to perform the work sufficiently well to maintain "nor-
mal business operation." The purpose of Title VII is to provide
equal employment opportunity. If there are prejudices on the
basis of which this opportunity is being denied, it should also be
the purpose of the Act to create the social atmosphere needed
to alleviate the prejudice. Thus, in balancing the desirability of
providing equal employment opportunity and eliminating preju-
dicial social attitudes against some drop in profits, Title VII's
prohibition against discrimination should prevail. Any drop in
profits would be temporary since all competing employers will
be similarly situated and customers will have no choice between
one business that discriminates and one that does not.
Having determined that the weight limitation was a "bona
fide occupational qualification," the court too abruptly found that
the limitation satisfied the second statutory element that the
limitation be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of
Colgate's plant. It could be argued that the exception would
be satisfied by a showing that statistically a large percentage of
females cannot perform a certain job without disrupting normal
operations. Therefore, a discrimination based on this showing
alone might be permissible as "reasonably necessary to the nor-
22. 272 F. Supp. 353-57.
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mal operation" of a business. 23 However, the court apparently
did not restrict "reasonably necessary" this narrowly. The court
looked to evidence that it was not commercially practical for
Colgate to assess each individual's ability and still maintain
"normal business operation."
It is not clear, however, that the court gave the matter of
assessing individual ability sufficient consideration. It took the
position that since the jobs required lifting over thirty-five
pounds, it was not practical to operate without the limitation.
No further explanation was given. However, evidence was intro-
duced showing that the jobs could be performed by women on
an individual basis with proper instruction and that in fact some
plaintiffs already could perform the prohibited work. Further-
more, it was proved that under the old contract, men were
assigned to jobs without regard for their ability to perform the
work even though Colgate realized -that not all men could per-
form the jobs in an equally efficient manner. From the evidence
as to certain plaintiffs' abilities, it can be inferred that some
women could perform certain prohibited tasks as efficiently as
some men. And'since not all women had the seniority necessary
to acquire these jobs, it appears that Colgate would be able to
determine the capabilities of those having seniority without
unreasonably disrupting normal business operations. Such an
individual determination would follow from the apparent intent
of Title VII to judge women as individuals according to their
abilities, rather than as members of a class whose characteristics
23. Cf. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 182 F. Supp. 595
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
962 (1961), where a blanket prohibition on flying by commercial
air carrier pilots over sixty years old was deemed reasonable in light
of medical data that at this age, or even younger, deteriorating physical
health rendered them increasingly susceptible to heart attacks and other
illnesses and the prohibition was considered in the best interests of air
safety. The court held that it was not necessary to give each pilot a
hearing to determine his particular health status even though he might
be in good physical' condition not only because'it was not required by
the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14:21, see 276 F.2d at 896-97, but
also because the public interest in the matter was strong due to the
disastrous consequences that could result in the event of an air fatality.
In the pilot situation, there is a federal agency operating under a
congressional directive whose judgment, if reasonable, will not be re-
placed by the court's. See 182 F. Supp. at 599. However, in an em-
ployment situation such as in Colgate, an employer is exercising a pri-
vate judgment as to whether the discrimination is reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of his business and so the element of a wrong
decision resulting in disaster is missing. Therefore, it would be reasona-
ble to require testing on an individual basis where it would not impose
too great a burden on the employer.
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the individual may or may not possess.2 4
Motive appears to be a factor in the court's decision as to
the weight lifting discrimination. The court noted that the
seniority and job assignment system under the new contract, of
which the weight limitation is a part, was the result of the
pressures and compromises of the collective bargaining process
and, thus, was not adopted in order to avoid the consequences
of Title VII.25 Thus, it may be inferred that had the system
been implemented to avoid Title VII, the court would have re-
quired Colgate to establish procedures which would provide for
testing ability on an individual basis. Thus, if two similar sys-
tems existed and one was developed through the bargaining
process over a period of years while the other was implemented
so as to take advantage of a "bona fide occupational qualification,"
the former system would be sustained on what would logically
seem an immaterial difference. The only relevant determination
should be whether alternatives are available which would either
alleviate the discrimination or reduce its extent without creating
unreasonable hardship to the normal operation of the business.26
In this way the process of balancing the purpose of Title VII
and the burden imposed on the business could best be imple-
mented to achieve the desirable result.
A separate difficulty arises from the court's blanket prohi-
bition against stereotyped characteristics as the basis for dis-
crimination. Those physical differences between the sexes which
may come within the exception to Title VII might be identical
to stereotype characteristics which were declared by the court
not to fall within the exception. For example, that women gen-
erally are not capable of strenuous physical work is a stereotype
attitude. On the other hand, the court determined that this was
a physical difference on which discrimination could be based.
The court's citation of scientific data27 showing such a difference
supports the court's decision. Thus, rather than reject all stereo-
types per se, it would be better to allow discrimination based on
24. Jane Crow 239; LRX LAB. RaL. RFp. 1882.
25. 272 F. Supp. at 357.
26. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cautions
against disrupting longstanding employment practices resulting from
collective bargaining agreements without achieving compensating ben-
efits in terms of equal employment opportunity. See LRX LAB. REL.
REP. 1835. Businesses should not be required to radically rearrangejobs, but should make some adjustments to avoid unnecessary layoffs.
See In re Whittaker Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Local
575, 44 Lab. Arb. 152, 153 (1965).
27. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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differences which are grounded on something more reasonable
and concrete than popular value judgments.
Finally, the court apparently was influenced by state legis-
lation fixing weight limits for women and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's finding that it could not assume that
Congress by passing Title VII intended to strike down such state
legislation.28  Reliance per se on the existence of legislation is
unwarranted for several reasons. Some of these state laws,
although originally for valid protective reasons, have ceased to
be relevant to modern technology or the expanding role of
women in the economy.2 9 Also, many of these laws were passed
so many years ago that the data on which they were based might
now be obsolete,30 or the attitude which prompted their passage
might have been based on stereotypes unsupported by scientific
data.31 Furthermore, the laws themselves may deny equal em-
ployment opportunity and thus must yield to Title VII under the
supremacy clause. 32
As a corollary to this argument, a reliance on EEOC deter-
minations is justifiable to some extent because of the Commis-
sion's expertise in the area, but this does not mean that the
rationale underlying EEOC determinations should go unques-
tioned. This is of necessity true in -the area of state legislation
where the new policy of the EEOC has been to refrain from
making determinations on the merits where Title VII and state
laws conflict, and to advise the parties of their right to bring
suit in an effort to secure judicial determination of the matter.3 3
28. 272 F. Supp. at 354-55, 361.
29. See Enforcement of Sex Discrimination Ban Under Title VII,
1966 LAB. REL. REP. YEAR BOOK 167, 168.
30. See Jane Crow 237; Call by EEOC for Court Challenge to State
Law, 1966 LAB. REL. REP. YEAR BOOK 355.
31. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Court stated
that when there is doubt as to whether the inequalities between the
sexes do exist, widespread and long continued beliefs concerning the
matter are worthy of consideration. Such widespread beliefs include the
idea that women's physical structure and maternal functions place her
at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence, that women have
always been dependent on men, that the sexes differ in functions per-
formed by each, amount of physical strength, and capacity for long
continued labor. Id. at 420-22.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-7.
33. See LRX LAB. REL. REP. 2062. But in one case before the
Arizona Civil Rights Commission, where a state law restricting women's
work week to forty-eight hours came int-o direct conflict with the state
and federal civil rights laws, the civil rights laws controlled. See
Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., Case No. 17-12E (Arizona
Civil Rights Comm'n, Dec. 2, 1966); Women's Protective Laws Versus
Civil Rights Acts, 1966 LAB. REL. REP. YEAR BOOK 370.
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